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Abstract
In this paper, we show that a recently published lightweight adaptation of a Fingerprint
matching algorithm called the Minutia Cylinder-Code may not be secure as intruders may
be able to illegitimately yet successfully authenticate themselves to the system under
consideration. We also show that the lightweight adaptation has other privacy related
vulnerabilities that make it unsuitable for use in Biometrics. We make it clear that we are
neither investigating nor commenting on the security of the original Minutia Cylinder-Code
algorithm by itself, rather we highlight the vulnerabilities of the lightweight adaptation. In
the process of doing this, we provide a high-level overview of the role of one-way functions
in cryptography and biometrics to provide a context to the aforementioned lightweight
algorithm and its deficiencies.
Keywords: Biometric Security, IoT Security, Minutia Cylinder-Code, Cancelable Biometrics,
One-way functions, Schneier’s Law
1 Introduction
In [1], Cappelli, Ferrara and Maltoni proposed a novel Fingerprint recognition technique called
the Minutia Cylinder-Code (MCC) and is based on 3D data structures called Cylinders. In
an article in the March 2019 issue of IEEE Communication Magazine [2], Yang, Wang, Zheng,
Yang and Valli presented a new Privacy Preserving Lightweight Biometric system for resource
constrained IoT devices, where an improvement of the aforementioned MCC algorithm was
proposed. As it is not our intention to investigate the original MCC algorithm in this paper, we
refer the readers to [1] for details on the MCC technique.
In this article, we focus on the privacy preserving lightweight adaptation of the MCC algorithm
proposed in [2] where the authors intend to improve the energy efficiency of biometric
systems in an IoT environment and call it the green issue. They list various Biometric
recognition/authentication algorithms in the literature and then select the MCC algorithm
before proceeding to propose improvements to this algorithm with an intention to enhance
the security and privacy aspects of the system while at the same time make it lightweight
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and thus energy efficient. They call their main contribution as A Block Logic Operation Based
Lightweight Biometric System which we abbreviate as BLOBLBS in this article for convenience.
The authors focus on the authentication aspects of the Biometric system under consideration
and they write in their paper [2]
. . . If an imposter rather than the actual user tries to access the device, the authentication
mechanism should be able to detect it and prevent such intrusion. . .
While we focus on the aforementioned BLOBLBS algorithm in this paper, we refer the reader to
[2] for other details such as experimental results and analysis. Before we focus on the BLOBLBS
algorithm, we take a detour and provide with a brief overview of one-way functions and its
utility in security areas such as cryptography and biometrics. This detour is intended to provide
a broader context in which the BLOBLBS algorithm was designed (The BLOBLBS algorithm is
itself an example of a one-way function as we will see later in this paper). The rest of this paper
is structured as follows: After providing an overview of one-way functions in Section II, we
outline the BLOBLBS algorithm in Section III and then proceed to show in Section IV that the
authentication mechanism based on this algorithm can be totally compromised (compromised in
100% of the cases). We also show in Section IV that other vulnerabilities make the BLOBLBS
algorithm unsuitable for use in Biometrics. We conclude in Section IV with a timely remainder
of the so called Schneier’s Law.
2 One way Functions
One way functions, as the name indicates, is a mathematical function y = f(x) such that it is
easy to compute y given the input x, but not easy to do the reverse (that is, given y, it is not
easy to determine the corresponding value of x).
One way functions are important in some areas of computer security, for example in
Cryptography. Cryptography enables people to communicate using a public communication
channel such that an adversary may learn very little on what is being communicated even
though the public communication channel, by default is insecure. Cryptography also enables
authentication and message integrity. Cryptography is heavily reliant on one-way functions to
achieve its objectives. An instance of a one-way function useful in cryptography is as follows:
While one can quickly or efficiently multiply two prime numbers p and q (a prime number is
a positive integer which is not divisible by any other integer other than 1 and itself) to get
the product n = p ∗ q, it takes considerably more time to discover the two primes p and q
given just n and at the same time both p and q are unknown. This is known as the problem
of factorisation and as the size of the primes becomes larger, it becomes a computationally
difficult problem to discover p and q. The notions of quickly/efficiently and computationally
difficult are to be understood in the context of computational complexity theory and a formal
and rigorous treatment of these notions can be readily found in the literature in this area
[15, 16, 17]. The computational difficulty should hold in most cases and not confined to worst-
case test scenarios. Off course, legal users of the system should not be confronted with this
computational difficulty whereas the adversary should, resulting in a computational gap between
legal users and adversaries. The well-known RSA cryptosystem depends on the computational
difficulty of factorisation. Other such computationally difficult problems that are useful in
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cryptography include the so called Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) that is at the core of
encryption schemes such as the ElGamal scheme and digital signatures schemes such as the
widely employed Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). The DLP, while very informally is the task
of reversing the exponentiation operation in a finite set with an intention to find the exponent,
requires more mathematical machinery to describe clearly and rigorously than that required
for the factorization problem. As it is not our intention to cover the requisite mathematical
machinery in this paper, we refer the reader to any of the excellent books on cryptography, for
example [12, 19], to explore the details. Chapter-2 in [19] contains a rigorous analysis of one-way
functions. The elliptic curve (informally, a cubic curve satisfying some properties) analog of the
DSA is used in the now famous Bitcoin cryptocurrency and a few other such Blockchain based
applications. It has to be mentioned here that no one knows if one way functions actually exist!.
One-way functions such as factorisation and the DLP are only conjectured to be one-way and the
one-wayness of these functions have been the subject of intense research by mathematicians. As
mathematicians spend more and more effort trying to efficiently reverse these one-way functions
without success, the confidence in the assumption that it is indeed difficult to reverse these one-
way functions increases. Thus, one would expect more confidence in the alleged one-wayness of
the factorisation problem than that of the so called isogeny problem as the isogeny problem is a
new entrant to this category of problems whereas factorisation is a much older problem. (that
is, mathematicians have spent more time trying to solve the factorisation problem efficiently
than the isogeny problem). The isogeny problem is constructed using elliptic curves but this is
not the same as that of the elliptic curve analog of the DLP problem referred to above. Success
for any mathematician in cracking any one of these afore mentioned problems will certainly
make her/him famous, but will also be disastrous for cryptographic security and every business
depending on cryptographic security. Luckily for the security community, this has not happened
thus far in the case of factorisation and the DLP. Nevertheless, if an intruder is able to somehow
efficiently factorise, then she/he can certainly compromise the RSA cryptosystem, but so far
there are no known efficient algorithms for factorisation. On the contrary, no one knows if there
are ways to compromise RSA without being able to efficiently factorise. Cryptographic hash
functions, other than the ones that have been broken thus far such as MD5 and SHA1, are
another example of one-way functions. It is now known that alleged one way functions such
as factorisation and the DLP (including the elliptic curve analog) are vulnerable to quantum
computer attacks whereas the new entrant, the Isogeny problem is thought to be resistant
to these attacks. The anticipation of Quantum computers materializing in the near future is
the reason for Post-Quantum Cryptography [18] being the subject of intense research currently
and this area includes the aforementioned isogeny based cryptography and other areas such as
Lattice-based cryptography and code-based cryptography.
In Biometrics (the metrics of human characteristics such as a fingerprint, face, eyes etc used
to identify people) too, a so called non-invertible function is utilized to create a distorted or
a transformed version of a Biometric and this distorted version is then stored in the biometric
database during the process of registering a new user to the system, similar to the process of
registering a new user in a password based authentication system. It is not uncommon in the
Biometric literature to call this non-invertible function as a one-way function [4]. The reason
for performing this transformation is that if the original biometric template is stolen, then the
owner of that biometric cannot use it ever again. After registration and during the process of
authenticating oneself, the user’s biometric is translated using the same non-invertible/one-way
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function that was used during registration and this is then compared with the transformed
version stored in the database. Just as in the case of passwords, where the plaintext password
by itself is never stored anywhere, the original Biometric is never stored anywhere and thus the
danger of loosing the original Biometric template is minimized. This enables biometrics to be
revoked and reissued just as a current password can be canceled and a new password can be
setup when the current password has been compromised. This topic is thus studied under the
umbrella of a research area called Cancelable Biometrics which signifies that the transformed
Biometrics can be canceled when required and a new transformed version reissued. Cancelable
Biometrics is one of the ways to protect original Biometric templates. A good overview of
template protection techniques can be found in [11].
Even though the term one-way function is used both in the cryptography and cancelable
biometrics literature, they don’t mean exactly the same across the two areas. In cryptography,
when a successful attempt is made to reverse the one-way function, the solution has to exactly
match the initial inputs to the one-way function, whereas in biometrics the one-way function
is usually a many-to-one mapping and the hope is that the original biometric, that is intended
to be hidden, is just one of many possible inputs to the one-way function. Thus even if the
one-way function is compromised by someone who attempts to reverse the one-way function, it
is hoped that the original input (which is the original Biometric) to the one-way function is not
recovered by the adversary thereby minimizing the chances of the original biometric being stolen.
However, if the one-way function is reversed resulting in an exact or even just a close match with
the original biometric, then the authentication mechanism utilizing this one-way function can be
compromised and an intruder can illegally but successfully authenticate herself/himself to the
biometric system. If the intruder is able to reverse the one-way function and obtain the original
input, then the original biometric is revealed to the intruder. If the intruder is able to reverse
the one-way function but not obtain the original input, then the original biometric is hidden
from the intruder, but can still authenticate herself/himself to the system. Conceptually, this
is similar to a password based authentication system where the hash of the password is stored
in the database during registration and during subsequent authentication attempts, the user
supplies her/his password and then the hash of the supplied password is compared to that
stored in the database and if an exact match occurs, then the user is positively authenticated.
Even if the password supplied by an intruder is different from the original one used by the
legitimate user, if the hash function produces the same output as it did for the legitimate user
(that is, there is a hash-function collision), then the intruder will obtain access to the system,
though illegally, without even knowing the original password. To emphasize this point in the
context of biometrics, we quote Nandakumar and Jain from a recent paper [10]. They write
. . . it may not be necessary to exactly recover the original template from the protected
biometric reference. Instead, it is sufficient for the attacker to obtain a close approximation
(also known as a pre-image), which can be replayed to the system to gain illegitimate access. . .
There are additional important properties that a one-way function in cancelable biometrics
should satisfy. Transformations introduced by the same one-way function on original biometrics
of the same individual authenticating to the same entity should be close to each other such that
the authentication system can successfully match the different transformations as belonging
to the same individual and positively authenticate that individual. However two or more
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transformations introduced by the one-way function on original biometrics of the same individual
authenticating to two or more different entities should not match with each other, else this can
result in cross-matching and can lead to an individual’s privacy being compromised. Moreover,
transformations produced by the one-way function on original biometrics of different individuals
should not match with each other. For more details of properties of one-way functions utilized in
cancelable biometrics, we refer the reader to [5, 6]. It is these additional properties that one-way
functions should satisfy that make the nature of one-way/non-invertible functions in cancelable
biometrics different to the one-way functions used in cryptography. Thus a cryptographic hash
function which is a one-way function cannot be directly employed in cancelable biometrics, as
even small variations in input can lead to large differences in the output.
While there are well understood techniques from computational complexity theory to measure
the difficulty of reversing one-way functions and is considered standard in cryptography, these
methods do not suffice in biometrics and moreover there are no universally accepted techniques
to quantify template protection algorithms [10] in Biometrics. Nagar and Jain introduced
a measure of non-invertibility in the context of cancelable biometrics in [7]. Metrics for
benchmarking biometric template protection algorithms were outlined in [9]. Further efforts
including standardization in this direction by the biometrics community are summarized by
Rane in [8]. Yet in addition to the metrics referred to above, the strength of non-invertibility
depends on the computational complexity of the best available algorithms to reverse the one-way
function [10], just as in cryptography.
Commonly known one-way functions in the cancelable biometrics literature include geometric
transforms, random projections and biohashing. A class of one-way functions suitable for
Biometrics are called continous one-way functions by Grigoriev and Nikolenko in [13]. They
write
. . .We understand continuity in the regular mathematical sense: a continuous function maps
close points of a Euclidean space to close points of another Euclidean space. This setting makes
perfect sense for Biometric applications . . .
Just as in the case of the DLP in the cryptography domain, description of one-way functions
useful in biometrics referred to above requires more mathematical machinery than we intend
to develop in this paper. We refer the reader to [4] for more details and a summary of these
one-way functions.
In the light of the above discussions, it would not be an unreasonable hypothesis to state that
constructing good one way functions for cancelable biometrics may be more involved that those
suitable for cryptography.
Now the algorithm that we referred to in Section I of this paper (i.e., the BLOBLBS algorithm
proposed in [2]) is an instance of a one-way function in cancelable biometrics and this algorithm
is the subject of focus in subsequent sections in this paper.
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3 The BLOBLBS Algorithm
The BLOBLBS algorithm was designed to enhance security pertaining to user authentication.
In fact, the authors in [2] write
. . .The proposed lightweight biometric system aims to offer user authentication to IoT devices
with enhanced security . . .
The BLOBLBS as proposed in [2] can be outlined as follows:
In the biometric enrollment stage, the minutiae is first extracted and then a binary vector is
constructed from this extraction. For simplicity, let us assume that this binary vector is saved
in a file F1. Further the authors define a transformation called the Block Logic Operation(BLO)
which transforms F1 into another binary vector that can be saved in another file F2 and this
consists of the transformed template. The transformation is such that the size of F1 is greater
than F2. Biometric authentication consists of two stages - enrollment and matching. In the
matching stage, the three steps of minutiae extraction, binary feature generation and application
of the BLOBLBS algorithm are performed exactly as in the enrollment stage and then the
corresponding transformed templates (F2) from the two stages are compared to determine if
there is a match.
The transformation from F1 to F2 is as follows: The file F1 is sliced into many segments with
each segment containing, a fixed odd number, say 5 bits (b1, b2, b3, b4 and b5) each. Each such
segment can be written in the form of a 5-tuple (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5). Each such 5-tuple slice in the
file F1 is transformed to a 4-tuple as (b1 ⊕ b3, b2 ⊕ b3, b4 ⊕ b3, b5 ⊕ b3) = (c1, c2, c3, c4) where
⊕ denotes the XOR operation and the sequence of 4-tuples concatenated corresponding to the
sequence of 5-tuples in F1 make up the file F2.
The authors in [2] describe a file F1 of size 1792 bits. Without loss of generality and for
convenience, we take this size to be 1795 bits. If F1 is of size 1795 bits, since there are 359 slices
of 5 bits each in F1, the size of F2 will be 1795− 359 = 1436 bits. Thus, in general, the size of
the biometric feature vector is reduced and the authors in [2] write
. . . the key is choosen from the biometric feature itself and discarded after use, so that the
risk caused by key loss can be avoided . . .
However, the question to be asked is, does the proposed algorithm enhance the security of user
authentication as claimed in [2] and is it suitable for cancelable biometrics? In the next section
we show that the authentication mechanism, when the BLOBLBS algorithm is employed, can be
effortlessly compromised. In other words, instead of enhancing the security of the authentication
mechanism, the BLOBLBS algorithm reduces the security to such an extent that an imposter
does not encounter any resistance when trying to impersonate herself/himself. In addition, we
provide reasons to show that the algorithm does not lend itself well to the requirements of
one-way functions in cancelable biometrics.
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4 Issues with the BLOBLBS Algorithm and its
Vulnerabilities
To perform a rigorous security analysis of a Biometric authentication system (or for that matter
any other security system), the system needs to be adequately described.
The need for a rigorous treatment of cryptography is well explored in Chapter-1 of [19]. Goldreich
writes in [19]
. . . it is implicitly assumed that the basic concepts of cryptography (e.g., secure encryption)
are self-evident (because they are so natural) and that there is no need to present adequate
definitions. The fallacy of that assumption is demonstrated by the abandon of papers (not to
mention private discussions) that derive and/or jump to wrong conclusions concerning security.
In most cases these wrong conclusions can be traced back to implicit misconceptions regarding
security that could not have escaped the eyes of the authors if they had been made explicit.. . . .
and backs the above argument with a well-known example. Rigorous treatment in the area of
Biometric security is useful too, as evidenced in a 2005 paper [14] where Atallah et al present a
lightweight scheme for biometric authentication and in the process of doing so, they define the
adversary model stating clearly what the adversary can and cannot do, paving way for a rigorous
security analysis of the authentication protocols presented further in their paper. Similarly, in
the case of BLOBLBS, an adequate definition of the adversary strength and its goals could
enable a good evaluation of system security enabled by the algorithm.
Nevertheless, in the absence of a clearly defined adversary model accompanying the BLOBLBS
algorithm in [2] and with the information available to us in that paper, we proceed to perform
a security analysis of this algorithm and show that there are security and privacy issues with
the algorithm.
We wish to state here that even if the adversary model were to be precisely defined, we anticipate
that the BLOBLBS algorithm would still be vulnerable. The security and privacy of BLOBLBS
depends on the answers to the following questions:
(i) Given a segment in F2, how difficult or easy is it for the adversary to reconstruct a
corresponding segment in F1.?
(ii) Can there be a cross match of the transformed templates between various databases (in
this case, various IoT devices) thus enabling identification of the same individual enrolled across
databases compromising privacy?
(iii) Just as in the case of passwords, is it easy to revoke/cancel a template and issue a new
protected template in its place based on the same feature?
(iv) Is recognition accuracy impacted in the transformed domain?
We answer these questions below:
(i) Given F2, it would suffice if we can efficiently construct a segment in F1 that maps to
the corresponding one in F2. This is easy to do. Given a 4-tuple (c1, c2, c3, c4) in F2, one
can construct the corresponding 5-tuple in F1. In fact, two such 5-tuples in F1 map to the
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same 4-tuple (c1, c2, c3, c4) in F2. These two 5-tuples are (c1 ⊕ 0, c2 ⊕ 0, 0, c3 ⊕ 0, c4 ⊕ 0) and
(c1 ⊕ 1, c2 ⊕ 1, 1, c3 ⊕ 1, c4 ⊕ 1).
Given that the notation A denotes the complement of the boolean variable A, it is easy to see
that ci ⊕ 0 = ci ⊕ 1 and ci ⊕ 1 = ci ⊕ 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. This is because, in general for boolean
variables A and B, it is easy to verify that A⊕B = A⊕B. In other words, each of the elements
in one of the 5-tuples above is a complement of the corresponding element in the other 5-tuple.
Given that either of the two 5-tuples above (c1⊕0, c2⊕0, 0, c3⊕0, c4⊕0) or (c1⊕1, c2⊕1, 1, c3⊕
1, c4 ⊕ 1), when subject to the BLO transformation, can produce the 4-tuple (c1, c2, c3, c4) and
since the 4-tuple (c1, c2, c3, c4) can assume 16 possible values, it is easy to list the corresponding
two 5-tuples for each of the 16 possible 4-tuples. For example, for the 4-tuple (1, 0, 1, 0), one can
construct the corresponding two 5-tuples by computing (1⊕0, 0⊕0, 0, 1⊕0, 0⊕0) = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0)
and (1⊕1, 0⊕1, 1, 1⊕1, 0⊕1) = (0, 1, 1, 0, 1). Thus, one can construct a F1 segment corresponding
to a F2 segment and the security of the system can thus be compromised.
F2 (4 bits) F1 (5 bits) F2 (4 bits) F1 (5 bits)
0000 00000 0001 00001
11111 11110
0010 00010 0011 00011
11101 11100
0100 01000 0101 01001
10111 10110
0110 01010 0111 01011
10101 10100
1000 10000 1001 10001
01111 01110
1010 10010 1011 10011
01101 01100
1100 11000 1101 11001
00111 00110
1110 11010 1111 11011
00101 00100
For completeness, we provide the mapping for each of the 16 possible 4-tuples, in the above
table.
Example:
(a) Let F2 = 1010. Thus F2 has n = 1 block of 4 bits and from the above table, F1=10010 or
01101. Thus, there are 2 possibilities for F1.
(b) Let F2 = 10101000. Thus F2 has n = 2 blocks of 4 bits each. The two blocks are 1010 and
1000. For the block 1010 in F2, the possibilities for the corresponding block in F1 are 10010 and
01101. Similarly for the block 1000 in F2 = 1000, the possibilities for the corresponding block
in F1 are 10000 and 01111.
Thus when F2 = 10101000,
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F1= 1001010000 or 1001001111 or 0110110000 or 0110101111.
Thus there are 4 possibilities for F1 as each block in F1 has two possibilities and there are n = 2
blocks. Any of the 4 possibilities above for F1 will produce F2=10101000.
In general, if there are n blocks in F1 (or F2), there are 2
n possibilities for F1, as there are 2
possibilities for each block in F1. It is not required for an adversary to exactly reproduce the
original F1 for a given F2. Any F1 that maps to a given F2 will compromise the system. Thus,
even though the original template may be safeguarded, the process of biometric authentication
is completely compromised as the system offers zero protection against an imposter trying to
authenticate herself/himself to the system in contradiction to the aims of the authors in [2]. If
an imposter tries to access the device, the authentication mechanism cannot detect it and thus
cannot prevent intrusion.
Thus, in this case, we have shown that irrespective of the safety of the original biometric feature
(that is, irrespective of whether the original biometric feature is hidden or not), nothing can be
done to prevent an imposter from gaining access to the system without effort (there is no need
to study the complexity of the best known algorithm to reverse the one-way function, as all that
the imposter needs is the table above that can be constructed effortlessly).
It is straight forward to generalize the above attack to a BLOBLBS transformation of any
segment size. In addition, the greater the blocksize, the lesser the chance of hiding the original
biometric in the many-to-one transformation. For example, if the blocksize is as large as half of
F1, then there is a good 1-in-4 chance of recovering the original template, if the chance of any
bit in F1 being a 0 (or 1) is 1 in 2.
(ii) As outlined above, cross matching between IoT devices results in a compromise of Privacy.
Emphasizing this fact, the authors in [2] write
. . .What makes things worse is that other IoT devices may also use the same biometric
template from the same user. It is well known that the original fingerprint feature data can
never be changed, so the attacker could apply cross-matching on different IoT devices with the
restored fingerprint information. . .
It can be seen that the transformed template produced by the BLOBLBS algorithm is as
vulnerable to cross-matching as the original biometric templates are. This is because, for a
given input, the BLOBLBS algorithm will produce the same transformed template with every
IoT device as the transformation function is the same irrespective of the device. In other
words the transformed/protected templates across biometric databases can be linked and this
compromises privacy (i.e., since protected templates across databases will be the same for a
given entity, it could easily be inferred that it belongs to the same entity)
(iii) The fundamental need of using the BLOBLBS algorithm is to enable canceling and re-
establish protected biometric data of any system user. However, the BLOBLBS algorithm
always produces the same transformed template. Thus a different new template cannot be
generated and reissued when the previous one is to be retired. Thus the advantage of creating
a transformed template in the first place no longer holds.
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(iv) It is important that recognition accuracy is not impacted during the authentication process
due to the information loss introduced by the protection mechanism. In fact, if F1 is of size 1795
bits and is sliced up into 5-tuples, since there are 359 such blocks, even without adversaries,
many false positives can be generated, as (2359−1) combinations can produce as many matches.
Recognition accuracy may also be impacted when the number of segments is computed as
floor(a/b) where a is the size of F1 and b is the segment size, especially when b is large and
when the filesize is not a multiple of the segment size. In this case, the number of segments
can be taken to be roof(a/b) and extra padding could be employed to fill in the gap in the
last segment. Therefore, the absence of impact must be reported in big enough benchmarking
datasets and with enough precision. The proposed system is only evaluated in FVC 2002 [20],
and performance is reported only in terms of Equal Error Rate with a single significant digit,
which is not enough to make a sensible comparison with the corresponding unprotected system.
Other minor observations of [2] include the following: The blocksize in the BLOBLBS algorithm
is specified to be an odd number by the authors, but in experiments conducted, the authors
specify the blocksize to be 3, 5 and 30 though 30 is not even an odd number!.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we showed that it is possible to compromise the authentication process of a
recently proposed Privacy Preserving Biometric Authentication System for IoT Security by
authors in [2]. In the process of doing this, we touched upon some aspects of security, for
instance the ubiquitous one-way functions and the need for a rigorous description of a newly
proposed security system. We also showed that individual privacy is compromised too when the
recently proposed system is used.
While writing this article, we were reminded of what has now come to be known in the literature
as Schneier’s Law which we paraphrase as follows:
It is a safe idea to assume that a newly designed security system is unsafe unless there is
evidence otherwise.
Though the above law is intended to caution cryptography researchers and designers, the law
may be applicable in other areas of security as well, such as biometrics. For more colorful
versions of this law, we refer the reader to Bruce Schneier’s blog [3].
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